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21. Introduction
In the present paper an effort has been made to quantify the term
"effectivity" of a safeguards system and a method has been detailed
which can be used to compare the effectivity of a number of competing
safeguards systems.
It is quite evident that the actual costs incured by a safeguarding
authority in implementing all the measures of a safeguards system, have
to be associated very closely with the effectivity of that system. For
example, adefinite probability of detection for a given amount of fissile
material can be set at the beginning as the objection of a safeguards
system {-1_7. The costs of a specific safeguards system can then be optimized
with respect to this probability by varying the cost parameters (measuring
instruments, containment etc.) of the system. As has been shown later,
such optimized costs may be used to determine the relative effectivity of
comparable systems.
The question of effectivity has been studied with two different models
of safeguards systems. Tbe first one may be called the inspector's system.
In this model the inspectors can detect a diversion by observation and
surveillance and the model is based on the theory of games L-2_1. The other
is a statistical model based on the flow measurements of fissile material
at strategie points. Tbe second model has been treated at the beginning in
a simplified manner, when statements of the form 'something has been di-
verted' or 'nothing has been diverted', have been treated. At a later stage
this model has been elaborated.
It may be noted that both these models do not representthe reality
exactly and completely. Certain salient features of these two models
have been chosen to bring out the important characteristics of the method,
which has been developed in this paper for quantifying the effectivity of
a safeguards system.
32. Model for the Inspector's System; Cost Optimization and Definition of
Effectivity
The game theoretical model for the inspector's system is of the following
form: In a nuclear facility the operator can divert a certain (not quantified)
amount of fissile material at r places. There are k ( ~ r) inspectors who
safeguard the plant in a certain interval of time t
o
~ t ~ t 1.If an inspector
is at a place where a diversion takes place he detects it with the probabili-
ty q. (This is an extension of the model given in L-2_/; it is assumed for
example, that one inspector has a number of assisting personnel who safeguard
a eertain area of the plant aceording to a,given strategy.) The plant opera-
tors and the inspeetors have been assumed to choose, with the help of stocha-
stie experiments, certain strategies that is their mode of operation. A
strategy öf the operator would be tö choose in the iriterval t
o
~ t ~ t 1
the places where he would divert a eertain amount of fissile material, simi-
larly a strategy of the inspectors would be to choose the places where they
would control. It is assumed that the operators and the inspectors behave
in an optimal way that is both choose optimal strategies.
To camplete the game theoretical model, the pay off matrix has to be defined,
Le. the gain or the loss which the operator and the inspectors will have
in case the operator diverts fissile material and this diversion is detected
or not detected. Similarly, the gain or the loss of the inspectors when they
detect or do not detect the diversion of fissile material. It is assumed
that in a11 intervals of time in question the operator diverts at mo
places and m = const. It is defined that
o
(i) If the operator does not divert 80y material he has the
gain (and the loss) zero.
(ii) If the operator diverts material and this diversion is
detected at least once, he has the loss c, the inspeetors have
the gain e.
(iii) If the operator diverts material and this diversion is not
deteeted, he has tile gain d, the inspectors have the loss d.
With these definitions the gain of the operator becomes the loss of the
inspectors and this game beeomes a so ealled two person zero sum game.
4Now it can be shown {-2_7 that the optimal strategies for the operator
and the inspectors are those strategies in which a11 possible strategies
occur with equal probabi1ities. In this case the gain(or the 10ss) of the
inspectors is given by
k m
W == c - (c + d) (1- ~ ) 0
r
(1.1)
(definitions of all the symbols used are given at the end of this paper)
This gain is greater than zero, if the number k of the inspectors is
1ess than k , where
o
kar
o
mo r-;:-
(1- +-V c+d ) (1.2)
The probability of detection P (d,m ) is defined as the probability that the
o
inspectors detect at least at d p1aces a diversion when the operator diverts
at m places. In the following the simplified expression
o
p(m ) == P (d = 1, m )
o 0
(1.3)
is used which giv~the probability that the inspectors detect a diversion at
least at one place when the operator diverts at m places. If it 1S assumed
o
that the operator diverts the same amount of material at a11 p1aces, mo is
a measure for the diverted material. The calcu1ation gives
p(m ) = 1
o
rn
(1- qk ) 0
r
(1.4)
The error second kind ß(m ), that i s the probability that nothing will be
o
detected a1though the amount mo will be diverted, is given by
ak mo
ß(m ) == 1 - P (m ) = (1- ~ )
o 0 r
(1.5)
The error first kind, i.e. the probability that a diversion will be detec-
ted if nothing will be diverted, is zero (the inspectors indicate diversions
only, if they see them directly).
5In order to arrive at adefinition of effectivity one could proceed
in the following manner:
a) Some common property of all the safeguards systems is postulated,
which relate the probability of detection with the diverted
amount.
b) The costs for each of the systems are optimized with respect to the
postulate.
As will be seen, tmcosts optimized in this manner, as a function of
the diverted material, can be defined as a measure of the effectivity
of a system.
The postulates used in this paper are:
p(m ) .. l-e
o
(i) Postulate 1
----------
There exists
for example,
a relation between p (mo)
of the following type:
_ mo
a
and the amount diverted m
o
(1.6)
This cor~esponds to the assumption that the probability of detection
for sma11er amounts should be smaller and should increase with
larger amounts.
q. k .. r (1- e
Eq. (1.4) gives together with (1.6) a condition for k and q
1
a): (13 (1. 7)
The error of the second kind ß(m ) is less than ß
o
for m greater
o 0
than m
00
This gives with (1.5)
1
mq • k ~ r (1- ß 00)
o
(1.8)
(1.9)
6Equ. (1.7) and (1.9) are compatible if
1
m 1n 80
00
(1.10)
The error first kind a is less than a • This is always
o
fulfilled in the framework of the inspectors system chosen in
this paper.
~2!~l Further work to quantify these postulates is in progress. For
example instead of (1. 6) a step function which is zero for m 'm
o 00
might be more reasonable.
The total costs of the inspector's system as a function of k and q are
assumed to be as follows:
(1.11)
Optimization of C with respect to the boundary condition (1.7) (it is
assumed that (1.10) is fulfilled) gives
(1.12)
It may be seen from (1.12) that C t is independent of m (Curve I in Fig. 1).
op. 0
Let us assume that another safeguards system is represented by curve 11
in Fig. 1. It may then be defined that
(i) The effectivity of a safeguards system is given by the costs as
a function of the amount m of diverted material optimized with
o
respect to the postulates given above.
7(ii) One safeguards system is more effective than another
in a certain interval of m , if in that interval of m
o 0
the optimized costs of the former system are less than those
of the latter system.
Some further comments may be made on the last definition:
(i) According to this definition system I in Fig. 1 is more effective
than system 11 for m < m '. For m > m ' system 11 is more effec-
o 0 0 0
tive than system I.
(ii) In reality a given amount of budget may be taken to be available
for safeguards purposes. It is quite conceivable that the actual
amount of the budget determines the effectivity of any two systems
as shown in Fig. 2. For C t = C' t system 11 is more effective
op op
as it enables one to detect a smaller amount of diverted material.
For C • C 2, system I is more effective.
opt opt
(iii) In case the two systems do not differ according to the definition
given above, the probability of detection P(d, m ) instead of p (m )
o 0
may be used for fixing the effectivity of a system. In that case
two sets of curves, instead of two curves as given in Fig. 1, have
to be compared, and a more sophisticated comparison may be possible.
In the following pages it has been shown that the same definition
of effectivity can be used for the second modelwhich is based 011 the
statistical measurement of fissile material throughputs. Only the state-
ment "detection" has to be defined in an appropriate manner.
3. Models for the Flow Measurement System
The following models refer to those parts of the fuel cycle for which one
can establish a material balance.
~ t " t l the inspector is continously measur-
the throughput of a plant (input J. andIn
strategie points by flow measurements. Because of measur-
In the interval of time t
o
ing, n-times at the same time,
output J t) at
ou
ing errors these measurements are not exaet. The variance of one measurement
is OJ2, it is independent of the amount of measured material. One exaet
8measurement would give at t = t 1 the inventory J = J. - J of the1n out
plant. The result of n measurements is the average va1ue
J (in general not equal J). At time t = t} the inventory I of the
2plant is measured m-times. The variance of the measurement is 01 '
the average value of the m measurements is I. The inspector compares the
two values J and land states that a diversion has/has not taken place.
Two kinds of statements are possible:
a) The unaccounted los ses 1 of the plant (MUF) are
taken into consideration in form of a fixed fraction
€ of J. , that is 1 = J .. The inspector states either,
10 1n
that something has been diverted or that nothing has been
diverted; he does not state anything on the amount of divert-
ed material.
b) The inspector states that an amount m greater than ro' and
smaller thanm" is missing. Only after this statement he
takes into consideration the possible unaccountable losses
(~ruF) of the plant.
These models can be described with help of different statistical procedures
namely:
(i) the classical Bayes procedure,
(ii) the method of confidential intervals,
(iii) the testing procedure.
In the first method it has to be assumed that the parameter of the
stochastic variable which is to be estimated, is itself a stochastic
variable. The distribution function of this variable has to be known or
some suitable assumptions have to be made. In the second method the
statement of likelihood has to be introduced. In this paper the last named
method has been used as it a110ws for statements which can be used directly
for calculating the effectivity defined in part 2.
3.1 Model A: Not Quantified Statements of the Inspector
3.1.1 Statements of the Inspector
The inspector's hypothesis is J = I + 1, 1 =t J .• This means that he~ 1n
9assumes that fue fraction I of J. has been lost in the plant- (MUF).
in
Naturally this fraction can vary for different campaigns. It- is assumed
here thatthe inspector can estimate from his experience the va1ue of )
for the next campaign.
Note: Because of measuring errors~ theinspector does not know J.
---- inexact1y~ therefore~ he does not know 1 exact1y even if he knows ~ •
It is further assumed that he can estimate 1 in a satisfactory manner.
The inspector tests his hypothesis with the help of his n and m measurements
by a test o. This test 0 is defined by a region of acceptance A (0 ) =
(- 00 ~ z) and a critica1 region K (0) = A (0) in the following way: If
on the basis of the next n and m measurements the fo11owing relation
ho1ds
J - I - 1 E K (0) (3.1)
the inspector rejects his hypothesis that is he states that there was
a diversion. If~ on the other hand~ the fo11owing condition is fu1fi11ed
J - I - 1 E A (0) (3.2)
he does not reject his hypothesis~ in actual practice this means that
he states that there has not been any diversion.
The value of z and the error first kind~ i.e. the probability that
J - I - 1 E K Cd) for J - I - 1 = o~ are intimate1y connected. In order
to establi.sh this connection and for later purposes a special case of
the general law of transformations of distribution functions is intro-
duced here (see for example 1-3_7):
Let f~ (xl) and f~ (x2) be the frequency functions of a 1 and a 2 •
-1' -2-
Then
00
f b (zl) • _f clZZf'l (ZI+Zz)fa2 (z2)
lS the frequency function of b = a 1 - a2•
Now the error first kind (l is gi.ven by
(l = p (J - I - 1 ?- z / J - I - 1 = 0)
(3.3)
(3.4)
10
lf it is assumed that J and I are normally distributed with expec-
tation values J and land variances 0J2/n and 012/m, then wirh (3.3)
i +1. -! dZ I / dzZ
-_ -IM
This result in
a. = l-</> z(-) .° =
° I
1
"2
(3.5)
Here, • (x) is given byx
Hx) r:ll I exp t 2 ) dt= (- -'2.
.- .,
(3.6)
Bq. (3.5) gives the connection between a. and z. Lateron the value of z
and therefore that of a will be established with the help of the postulates
given in part 2.
3. L 2 Probabi1ity of Detection and Error Second Kind
The probabi1ity of detection p (mo) is defined by the probability that
J-1-1 >z, if mo is to be diverted. This means
= p (5-1-1 >z/ J-I-1 = m )
o
(2.7)
Again with the he1p of (3.3.)
1
?
°12 2z-roc (jJ~
P (m ) = 1- </>( ) er = ( -- + )0 (5 n m (3.8)
With the help of the probabi1ity of detection the error second kind
ß (m ), i .e. the probability that J-1-1 e: A(<') jf TI! is to ee diverted, can
o 0
be calculated:
Therefore from (3.8)
I-p (m )
o
(3.9)
(3.10)
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3.1.3 Costs and Optimization of Costs; Effectivity
The f0110wing form of the costs for the safeguards system based on
flow measurement has been assumed:
C= (3.11)
With this form the capital and the operating costs of the system have
bean symbolized. The postulates of part 2 are now
(i) A function for the probability of detection p(m ) is
o
postulated. Together with (3.8) this gives a cOlldition
for 6" :
z - mo
a = tri (1-p(m )
o
Rere, fl is the inverse function for ~.
(3.12)
(ii) It is postulated that the error second kind is less than
ßo for mo greater than mo • This giveswith (3.8 , 10)
z-m
1 (moo ) =$(
00 ) <8- p
a 0
In the case of eq. (1.6)
a~ 1 in i--_. --
moo ßo
is obtained.
0.13)
(3.14)
(iii) It is postulated that the error first kind is less than
This gives with (3.5)
CL •
o
z1 - ~(-) = CL
a 0
or in the limiting case
z1- <p (-) • CL
a 0
(3.15)
(3.16)
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Eq. (3, 16), that is condition (iii) fixes the value of z.
Eq. (3.12) and eq. (3.16) give a new condition for 0:
2
m
o
-1 -1 .2($ (l-a)- $ (l-p(m )))
o 0
(3.17)
Now again the problem is to optimize the costs in (3.11) with respect
to the variables ai' 0 12, n, m. Besides the condition (3.17) there are
natural conditions of the fol10wing form
(3.18)
Example
Let n=m=l and assume that in the fo110wing the conditions (3.18) and (3.14)
(or the equivalent for (3.14) for another form of the postulatedp(m ))are
o
fulfilled. Then from (3.11) and (3.17)
C (a
r
2)
a l a 2 0.19)= 2 + + ß r + 82
S -or2 0 1 2
C (0 r2) has the form given in Fig. 3.
The optimum costs C
opt and the optimum va1ues of 0 12 and oJ2 are obtained
in the following form:
2
C (010) =opt (
a 1 a 2
-2- + 2 ); 0 10 =y
2
y =
(3.20)
a
X= (1+i) ( y; + (2)
m 2
o
The optimum costs as a function of m can be expressed as follows
o 2
C (m) = X ( $-1(1-°0)- ep-1(1-p(mo)
opt 0
(3.21)
Two numerical examp1es are given to illustrate the method:
13
(i) For p(m ) eq. (1.6) let a • 0.5; let a= 0.05. Furthermore, let
o
m be chosen that 0 ~ m ~ 1 in the sense that m = 1 means the
o 0 0
unity of the effective mass {-4_7. The results are shown in Fig.4a
and 4b: Fig. 4a gives the postu1ated probability of detection and
Fig. 4b gives the optimum costs divided by ~ as a function of m •
o
Here,~ is defined by (3.21)
(ii) Let p(m ) be a step function as shown in Fig. 5a, and ~ = 0.05.
o 0
Fig. Sb gives the optimum costs divided by~ as a function of m •
o
No~, according to the definition given in part 2, fig. 4b or fig. 5b
gives except for the factor X the effectivity of the safeguards system based
on flow measurement. It can be compared with that of the inspector's system
once the costmctors are known.
than m
o
boundary of the critical region z.
Note: From (3.21) it is seen that the optimal value of 6.i2 is a function
of the amount of diverted material. This is not disturbing forfue following
reason. As al ready said in part 2 in practice there is a fixed budget C' •
opt
This budget establishes with eq. (3.20) the smallest amount m' of fissile
2 0
material which can be detected (see Fig. 4b). Since f ~ is an essentially
ascending function of m , it would mean that all diver.ted amounts m greater
o 0
can be detected for this fixed budget. The same is true for the
3.1.4 Comparison of the Statements with those introduced earlier /-1 7
(1) The 1ikelihood of djversion Pd was defined as a statement of the
inspector, as the assessment that an amount has been diverted with
1ikelihood Pd. The errors first and second kind in this paper are
fixed before the measurements of the inspector take p1ace. However,
they can be interpreted as being used after the measurements in the
following way:
(i) ]-1-1 €A: With likelihood 1-6 no diversion has taken p1ace.
(ii) J-I-1€ K: lvi th likelihood l-a a diversion has taken place.
In this sense, l-a and 1-6 are the above mentioned 1ikelihoods of
diversion.
14
(2) The risk of detection was defined as a statement of the operator:
If the operator intends to divert a certain quantity m , he is able
o
to calculate before the beginning of the measurements the risk ~
that the inspector comes to a statement Pd. This is the probability of
detection in this paper which has been calculated for fixed ex, 6.
Therefore the probability of detection is - in the words of 1-1_7
the risk for a fixed threshold of alarm.
(3) The probabi1ity P of proving was defined as a statement of thep
safeguards system designer; it is the prohabi li ty that in the case of
the diversion of the amount m of fissile material the inspector makes
o
any statement Pd about the diversion of the fraction ) of m
o
• In our
case Pd is fixed, name1y 1-ex and 1-6 • Therefore, in our case the
probabi1ity of detection corresponds to P , too.
P
3.2 Nodel B: Quantified Statements of the Inspector
3.2.1 Statements of the Inspector
As mentioned earlier. in thi s model the inspector first states the missing
material. Thereafter he takes into consideration the losses.
The inspector divides his n f10w measurements and his m inventory measure-
ments in the following form:
n n + n . m = ml + m~1 2' :.: (3.22)
The nt and m1 measurements are used by him for making a hypothesis on the
missing material whereas he uses the n2 and mZ measurements for testing his
hypothesis. The average va lues of the n l and m1 measurements are J nl
and
I
m1
Let
'\ = (3.23 )
N'ow the hypothesis of the inspector is
2 2 1
I:, -0 ~J-I ~ (
0J °1 ) 2" (3.24)1:,1 + a l ; °1 = -- + --I t n l ml
15
or, in short
H = )..:{ Lil - °1
~ ).. ~ Lil + oll; ).. = J-I (3.Z5)
niore generally H = {)..: öl-al ")..'=ö + aZJ).I
With the he1p of the nZ and mZ measurements the inspector tests his hypothe-
sis with a test C; which is given by the critical region K(C;) for A... = J - I
-L mZ m2
(3.26)
This means that the inspector rej ects his hypothesis if Liz € K (8) and that he
does not reject his hypothesis if LiZ I K (0).
Note: In the case that the hypothesis (3.25) is rejected, the inspector
divides his n and m measurements anew, that is he takes another set of n l
and ml measurements to form his hypothesis.
The test given above is characterized by an operation characteristic P (A)
which is defined by
(3.27)
The ca1cu1ation gives
Li -0 - A öl+01- A
P(A) = 1+ ~( 1 I )- ~( ); 02
°2 °z
(3.28)
The form of P (A) is given in Fig. 6.
For example, the upper boundaries for the errors first and second kind can
be expressed in terms of the operation characteristic P(A):
(i) CL I the upper boundary for the error first kind i s given by
With (3.28) one obtaines
(3.29)
CL = P( A= Ö+ ° ) =I 32 ) (3.30)
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(ii) /', the upper boundary for the error second kind, is given by
p (A2t K(o)/J-I fH) ~ ß
With (3.28) one obtains
ß = I-PO. = /', + ° ) ep( 2 0] ) - 1= -- 2I I
°2
From (3.30) and (3.32) one sees
CI. + ß= 1
(3.31)
(3.32)
(3.33)
Thus Ci and ß cannot be made as small as one wou1d like to have. However,
thi!'l would not matter much, as instead of postu1ating certain values
ofol and ft ' it may be postulated that the generalized errors are smaller
than some given values. More exact1y
(i) It is postu1ated that the generalized error first kind, that is the
probability that Ö2 > Ö] + aotor Ö2 <6 1-a 0] for AEH and a>l is
smaller than a. :
o
or
(3.34)
a. = 2 - <p(
o
i a+1)o]
°2
) - (3.35)
(ii) It i8 postu1ated that the generalized error second kind, that 18 the
probability that Ö 1- 01 ' Ö2 ' 6 1 + 01 for A > Ö] + bOl and b > 1 is
smaller than S :
o
(3.36)
or
(3.37)
17
These postulates mean that the probability, that for)j~H the value of .62
falls far from H (>8 1 + aOt or<8 1-ao l ) respectively that forA far from H
(>8 1+ bOJ or<8 1- bOI) the value of 82 falls into the region of acceptance,
is smaller than a o respectively ßo '
3.2.2 Probability of Detection
fissile material disappears. The probability that from the n l and
ments the inspector will find a value of t::. 1 between 11 and !J.+ dl1 is
It is assumed that in the course of the next campaign the amount m of
o
ml measure-
given by
(3.38)
The probability that fromthe n2 or. m2 measure.ments the inspeetorwill
find a value of 112 between /).- °1 and t::. +0 1, is given by
(3.39)
In this ease the inspector states that the amount m greater than 11-01 and
smaller than 8+ °1 is missing.
mli ) the prob.ability is defined that
form I an amount m wi th
Then°1 1S missing ' where m- 01 ~ m
l
, m+ 01 ~ mH.
m:l-o
1
== J dt::. P(I1-01~t::.2~1I+al)1I ~111~I1+dll /J=I+mo) =
ml+o
1
As probability of detection p (m ; mT ,
o
the inspeetor makes a statement of the
&- ° • m~~ +I
m"-o
= r Idl1 p(l1-oJ~I1,,~11
/ I ~
m'+o 1
+0,
I
/ J=I+m ). p(I1'I1.~lI+dt::. /J=I+m )
o· I 0'
m"-m -0
o I
2
x
2 )
ml-m +0
o 1
(3.40)
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Examp1e: Let
m' = m -20 • m" = m + 20101' 0
In this case from (3.40)
(3.41)
p(m ) = 2<P(1)
o
01 2
<P( (x-I» exp (- ~ )
0')..
(3.42)
Up to now the unaccountab1e losses (MUF) were not considered. They may be
taken into consideration in the fol1owing way. The inspector who states that
an amount m greater m' and sma11er than m" is missing, says: Because of my
experience I assume that the fraction r of the total input is MUF. Therefore
I state according to (3.24) that the amount A with
(3.43)
has been diverted. According1y the probability of detection p(m , m', m") is
o
the probability that the inspector will state that the amount) with
m-01- \ J in & A ~ m+0 1 -)' J in (3.44)
where m- o} ~ m', m+0 1 ' m", has been diverted if the amount mo will be
diverted.
3.2.3 Costs and Optimization of Costs; Effectivity
The costs of the safeguards system are as given by (3.11). Now the i.nspec-
tor makes quanti.tative statements, therefore the post~1ates of part 2 have
to be modified as they were adjusted to the case of non-quantitative state-
ments.
The fo11owing postulates are established to take care of the quantitative
nature of the model B.
(i) In connection with the probability of detection it is postu1ated
(1) m' and mll are functions of m , that ism'(m) and m"(m ).
0 0 0
(2) P (m ): = p(mo ; m' (m ), m" (m »0 0 0
(ii) The generalized error first kind is less than Ct •
0
(iii) The generalized error second kind is less than ßo '
19
Examp1e
Let according to (3.41)
(3.45)
and as in (1.6)
15 (m ) = 1- e
o
m
o
- --
a
Then from (3.42) and (3.45) the following conditions are obtained
2
0 1 = b = const;
2
o = g (m ) = : g2 0 (3.46)
Furthermore it is assumed that the postulates (i, ii) are satisfied by
(3.46) •
Therefore, the problem 1S to optimize
(3.47)
with respect to the conditions (3.46)
= g (3.48)
and the natural conditions
(3.49)
The solution is sketched below:
Let
(3.50)
According to (3.49) the allowed regions for Yl and Y2 are
20
From (3.48) one obtains
(] 2 = nS " b 2= m S
J 1 I 2
where
(3.51)
(3.52)
S =1
Y2 (l-y2)(-Y (b+g)+b)- S = (y 1(g+b)-b)2 '2 Y -Y1 2
(3.53)
The costs (3.47)
C = (3.54)
are optimized so that the relation
0.181
1 0.262
1 1 1
C(n ,m) 2( 2 ) 2
0. 1 )2 0.2 )2
= -) + 2 (- n = (- m = (-o 0 SI S2 0 81S1 0 82S2
(3.55)
is obtained.
2 2To optimize C(n
o
' m
o
) with respect to 0J ' 01 ' the eq. (3.52) is inserted
into eq. (3.55) and the following is obtained:
+
(3.56)
The minimum given by the boundary va1ues of 2 21S 0J , °r :
2 2 20. 1 2 0. 2C(n ,m ; aJo °ro ) = -- + (3.57)o 0 a 2 bZ
21
2 2
This is the absolute minimal va1ue of the costs C. By fixing 0J and G'
o 10
the va1ues of y1and Y2 are fixed andfuerefore, byeq. (3.50), n
v
and m~
for all v,~ with 1 t: v ~ n - 1, and 1 ,(; l' ~ m - 1. This assumes that the
boundary condition (3.51) for YI,2 is fulfi11ed.
The equations determining the optimal va1ues of YI and Y2 are
20/ ß 2 °1 20 1a2 0 ß2bZ8 10 = = =:A; 820 = = = : B (3.58)n 01,,1 m CX 20 0
therefore
(3.59)
Eq. (3.59) leads to an equation of third order in«:
where
Co= ~I (l+B- *)
A - b bCI= bAI L ( A - B) (A1-A2) - (g+b) (l+B- A) + (~ -1) B 7A
(3.60)
b b2 bA = (g+b) ( - - 1) - A2 = (g+b) (-A - 1) B + bBI A A
As follows from (3.51) one has to choose that solution of (3.00) which satis-
fies the condition
a
2
~y~l2 (3.61)
Eq. (3. 57) g~ves the effectivity of the system under consideration - i t is
independent of roo '
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(3.62)m") =m' ,
Note: In the framework of the inspector's system one had quantitative
statements, too, but they were not used, for one wanted to compare the
inspector's system with the system based on flow measurement in the form
of the former model A. For example, in the framework of the inspector's
system, the probability of detection p (m ; m', m") is given by
o
m" 2 m -v
o
( mO ) ( qk) (1-~ )
v n n
v=m'
Therefore, it would be possible to compare the inspector's system with the
system based on flow measurement in the form of model B also.
4. Compilation of Hain Formulas of Different Models
The more important expressions developed for the probability of detection,
error first and second kind, cost functions, and effectivity, for the two
safeguards systems, have been shown in Table I.
5. Conclusion
The analysis carded out in this paper shows that the effectivity of a safe-
guards system can be defined in a quantitative way. It also shows that the
effectivity defined in this manner can be used to compare widely different
safeguards systems.
Two models for a safeguards system with flow measurement, were studied on
the basis of testing hypotheses for the amount of diverted fissile material.
From the mathematical stand-point it is of particular interest, to note that
these tests were adjusted only with respect to the costs which they themselves
cause, and not, as is usually the case, the los ses (positive or negative)
which they cause. This slightly unusual way was chosen as in the case of
safeguards systems, the losses are difficult to quantify.
The models are not complete and further work is in progress.
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TAßLE I. COMPILATION OF MAlN FOm·fiJLAS
Instrumented System
Inspector's system
Model A Model B
0)
01 _ x2
- ep(- (x-1» lexp (- -- )
0- 22
I; m
Probability of jl'.:'.p(m )=1-(1- qk) 0
Detection ! 0 n
j!
Ii
1
I
!
1
I
___ .1 _~ __~_._ ~~
(1.4) ( (
z-m
p mo)= 1-ep ~)
I
(3.8) I
P (m "m' "m")0' ,
1
=-(fit
m"-m -0
o )jO) 0 1dK L-ep (02
m'-no+o)
(x+1)+
(3.40) N
W
(3.11)
(Upper boundary)
3 2°1
<X = - - cP( - )
z 0z
(3.5)<X = 1-4> (~)\0
,
\I <X = 0
.----1-------
Cost function
Error first
kind
Error second k m I z-m I (Upper boundary)
kindß(m )= (1- _.~L) 0 (1.5) !S(m) ... ep (__0) (3.10)11 2<:11 1on,· 0 ° ß = ep( _ ) __
I .__~ 1 02 2
<X <X
C = <XI k+<Xzq (1.11) I C = _1 + _2 + ß n + ß')m
0J2 °12 I "-
I
~.l ..__.__... . . . __
(3.57)
(3.21~.mo
Lr-----··-·---------·- -- . ----,-.------.--..- -
= 2 ( <XI <X2 <X3) 2] In the case n = m = 1 i In the special case given in eq.(3.45)i ! 2<X1 2<X2
'( ) C .(rn)'" +-i C m = , opt 0 a b
I opt 0 21 2 2I (ep -l(l-<Xo)- ep-l(l-P(%»1i~ 2
I
I
I
Effectivity i C t(m)
f " ' op 0.opt1rnum costs i
as a function of !,
diverted materia~
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J
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k
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n
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p
p (m )
0
q
r
t
w
z
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Number of inventory measurements
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Probability of detection
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Time
Value of, the game whieh describes the inspectois system
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Fig 1: Effectivity of safeguards systems:Optimized costs
as a function of material mo to be diverted.
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Fig.2: Effectivity of safegu.ards systems:.Forfixed budget
C10pt system TI is more eftective, tor fixed budget
C~opt system I is more eftective.
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Fig.3 Costs of 0 sofeguords system os 0 function of 6z:'-.
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Fig. 4a: Postulated probability of detection as a
tunetion of diverted material.
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Fig.4b: Ettectivity of the system: Optimized safeguards
costs as a function of diverted material.
Meaning of Copt Ix and mo' see text.
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Fi g. 5b: Effectivity of t he system: Cpt imized safeguards
costs as a function of diverted material.
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Fig.6 Operation characteristic of the test given by (3.28)
